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"'Ihave one last question. Is rate of return traditionally called the black
magic of the regulatory ring?"
Chairman, South Dakota Public
Utilities Commission
I.

INTRODUCTION

In times of judicial overload, courts are understandably less
than enthusiastic about receiving appeals from complex administrative proceedings. Certainly this is true of utility rate cases,
which present voluminous materials to review (a typical transcript
is 4,000 pages) and come infrequently enough to leave the court
with the uneasy feeling that it has fallen into wonderland, where
all language and customs are foreign. Yet, as this paper will develop, it is precisely these cases-highly charged with confrontation of customer against company, customer class against customer
class, and even government agency against government agencywhich critically require the ongoing development and application
of judicial standards. Though sorely tempted, courts dare not
shrink back from an active, participative role in the sound and
unbiased development of utility law.
This article focuses upon the application of judicial standards to
the critical issue of rate of return on common equity. Those judicial standards are of two basic types: (1) administrative appeal standards governing both the quality of the process and the quality of
the evidence supporting an administrative determination; and
(2) constitutionalstandards governing both the quality of the process
and the quality of the result. We demonstrate that these standards
are not static, but must evolve dynamically, synchronized to the
changing realities of the utility industry. We also demonstrate
that the decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court, while necessarily piecemeal, represent an integrated and, for the most part,
progressive application of judicial standards to rate case review.
Finally, we urge as the next logical step, the appropriate extension
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss2/12
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of those standards to resolve major dilemmas produced by current
changes in the industry.
II.

THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

Before addressing the issue of judicial review we will describe
the place of rate of return in the ratemaking process, summarize
typical rate of return approaches, and review relevant changes in
the industry to which regulation must respond.

A.

The Ratemaking Process

It is often said that regulation takes the place of competition;
that is, since the utility is granted a monopoly in its service territory it is necessary to impose some limits upon the utility's prices
because the normal limits imposed by competition are absent.
Under regulation, the utility's prices are limited to the recovery of
the costs incurred in providing service. Recognized costs include
labor, materials and supplies, taxes, insurance, and depreciation.
They also include the financing costs for dollars invested in utility
plant, office buildings, and equipment.
A utility cannot automatically raise its prices to recover cost increases. Instead, it must file a rate case and prove the increases, as
measured for a particular test year. Thus, the function of a rate
case is, first, to determine the revenue required by the utility to
recover its costs-the "Revenue" section of the case-and, then, to
design the rate schedules to generate revenue equal to that requirement and to spread it among the various customer classes-the
"Rate Design" portion of the case.
The process of determining revenues was succinctly stated in

Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Pub/ic Service Commission:1
First, the investment of the utility is calculated in a set of
figures known as the rate base. Next, the revenues and expenses
are analyzed to determine the net operating income of the company. When that net operating income is divided by the rate
base, the rate of return on rate base is derived, a critical item in
any rate proceeding.
In judging the fairness and adequacy of this rate of return,
the cost of the utility company's invested capital must be considered. A utility company's capital will generally consist of
fixed obligations, such as bonds, preferred stock and short-term
debt, and the investment of its stockholders which is the com1. 270 S.C. 590, 244 S.E.2d 278 (1978) (Ness, J., concurring and dissenting).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1982

3

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 12
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8

mon equity of the company. To determine the cost of this capital, the cost of fixed obligations (bonds, preferred stock and
short-term debt) is calculated and a reasonable return on the
investment of the company's stockholders (common equity)
must be established. These costs are combined to determine
the company's overall cost of capital. The rate of return on rate
base is then compared to the cost of capital which has been
established. If the rate of return on rate base is lower than the
cost of capital, the rates must be adjusted upward by the Comis
mission. It is on this basis that the general determination
2
made as to what rates are appropriate for utility service.
B.

Rate of Return Approaches

Rate of return is an element of the revenue side of the case. The
commission determines what return would be earned under current rates-the income earned at current rates for test year sales,
less test year expenses-; calculates what percentage rate of return
this represents in respect to the utility's total investment or rate
base; and then compares this rate of return to that which it determines to be the reasonable rate of return to be allowed. The deficiency or excess in that comparison then becomes the basis for any
increase or decrease in revenues to be reflected in the new rates. In
this broad sense, the rate of return is generally called the "overall
rate of return" and includes several elements-the overall capital
structure and the individual components of debt (long and short
term), preferred stock, and common equity.
The prevailing practice is to develop an overall rate of return
that is the product of the weighted cost of capital. For example, if
we assume the composite cost rate for debt is 9.0%, for preferred
stock is 10.0%, and for equity is 16.0%, the overall cost of capital
would be 11.9% with the following capitalization ratios:
Type of Capital
Debt
Preferred Stock
Common Equity
TOTALS

Ratio
50.0%
10.0
40.0
100.0%

Cost
Rate
9.0%
10.0
16.0

Weighted
Cost
4.50%
1.00
6.40
11.90%

While issues can arise on the other elements, litigation focuses pri2. Id at 606-07, 244 S.E.2d at 286.
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marily on the required rate of return for the common equity
element.
The general question to be determined relative to return on equity is always the same: what rate of return on equity will permit
the utility to earn the return required by equity investors, and
thereby allow it to attract on fair terms the equity capital necessary to provide service to the public.3 Over the years, several approaches to estimating the rate of return on equity have been
developed. It is recognized that the appropriate equity return simply cannot be derived by the mechanical application of any mathematical formula 4 and, because each of the approaches must be
based on underlying assumptions or theories, expert judgment is
required in their application. 5
For present purposes, we will summarize three common
approaches.
1.

The Comparable Earnings Approach 6

The comparable earnings approach is based on a review of the
returns achieved by other investments-including both regulated
and unregulated companies-having "comparable" investment
risk. The analyst defines the criteria for selecting a set of companies viewed by investors as having risks comparable to the subject
company. Many measures of risk are available and comparable
earnings studies have utilized a myriad of them. Once the set of
companies is selected, the actual earned returns of those companies, as a percentage of their book equity, are examined as being
indicative of the required return for the subject company. Frequently, adjustments are made to those earnings if it is perceived
that the companies are earning below or above their cost of equity,
3. See, e.g., Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262
U.S. 679 (1923); Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
See generally bnfra notes 69-116 and accompanying text.
4. See, e.g., Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 299 Minn. 1, 27-28, 216 N.W.2d 841,
857 (1974).
5. In Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679 (1923), the Supreme Court spelled out the requirement for the exercise of regulatory
judgment of multiple factors in fixing the rate of return, stating that the rate "must be
determined by the exercise of a fair and enlightened judgment, having regard to all relevant facts." Id at 692.
6. The comparable earnings approach is a direct attempt to satisfy the requirement
of Federal Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944), that "the return
to the equity owner should be commensurate with returns on investments in other
enterprises having corresponding risks." Id at 603.
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as indicated by market-to-book ratios below or above one. This
method, as all others, has its shortcomings. Its validity depends
upon the difficult task of finding true risk comparability. Advocates of the comparable earnings approach acknowledge that there
are no perfect measures of risk. Further, the question whether the
actual returns earned by these companies are equal to their cost of
7
equity is always problematic.
2.

The Ri's Premium Approach8

The risk premium approach is based upon the premise that investors demand a greater return for equity than debt to compensate for the greater risks of equity ownership. The risk premium is
the amount of additional return required by investors to compensate them for this added risk of equity investment. Risk premium
can be measured by viewing the historical differential between
what equity returns investors anticipated for equity investment
and what bond yields were required for the same companies over
the same time period. This differential, the "premium," is then
added to the current interest rate on the subject company's bonds
to determine the required market return on equity. The risk premium approach is similarly not capable of producing precise,
judgment-free results, since it cannot be shown that the relationship between the cost of debt and the cost of equity is constant
over time.9
3.

The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) Approach "0

Discounted cash flow (DCF) is a formula approach that assumes
an investor in common stock equity seeks a return on investment
composed of (1) current income to the investor-the dividend
yield-plus (2) anticipated growth in future dividends. The term
"discounted" stems from the fact that money has a time value in
considering an investment. The expected future cash payments
7. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-76-934 (Minn. P.S.C.
Mar. 2, 1977), at 36; Potomac Elec. Power Co., 64 P.U.R.3d 364, 383 (D.C. P.S.C. 1966).
8. The risk premium approach is a more indirect approach and addresses the other
criteria set forth in Hope-that the return should be sufficient to enable the enterprise to
"attract capital." Hope, 320 U.S. at 603.
9. See, e.g., Northern States Power Co., Docket No. E-002/GR-80-316 (Minn. P.U.C.
Apr. 30, 1981), at 32.
10. The discounted cash flow approach is a market-based approach that attempts to
determine directly what investors are requiring to place their investment in the subject
company. The assumption is made that the market evidence with respect to the subject
company can be used to discern what return is necessary to attract capital.
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can be discounted to their present worth in order to determine the
"real" value of a stock as estimated by the potential investor. Investors then decide whether or not to buy a stock by comparing
their own estimate of the stock's real value with the actual market
price of the stock. A simplified version of the DCF formula for
expected market return is set forth as follows:
K=

D

P+G
K is the required rate of return on equity, D is the sum of the
dividends to be paid in the coming year, P is the current market
price of the stock, and G is the expected long term growth rate of
dividends and ultimately of the stock.
A major difficulty with the DCF formula lies in predicting G,
the investor's expectations as to the future growth rate in dividends. DCF results can also be biased by changing the time frame
for determining D/P-, since the price of the stock is dynamic. Further, the return required by investors, as measured by DCF, is a
return in relationship to the market price. Since the rate of return
to be allowed in regulation will be applied to the rate base (more
akin to the book value of common equity), the use of DCF will
tend to maintain the market price at or below book value. 1"
Many other approaches, usually variations or combinations of
the above approaches, are presented to regulators. Computers led
to the development of sophisticated models, such as price-book statistical models. These models are conceptually similar to the DCF
formula. They attempt to predict what rate of return, if actually
earned, would tend to induce the investor to bid the price of the
stock to a level where new shares could be issued for net proceeds,
after deducting the cost of issuance and allowing for market pressures, at least equal to book value.
C

Changes in the Utility Industy

In addition to consideration of the regulatory framework, intelligent development of judicial standards must be responsive to real
changes in the regulated industry. For example, few industries
have changed as radically as the energy industry. With those
changes, pressures developed which made it difficult, if not impossible, for a utility to actually earn the allowed rate of return. This,
11. See, e.g., Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 299 Minn. 1, 27-28, 216 N.W.2d 841,
857 (1974).
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in turn, places pressure upon judicial standards designed to protect
the utility's opportunity to earn a fair rate of return.
Electric and gas utilities began as small, local enterprises. After
the initial capacity was installed, there were decades of steady demand growth, with additions to plant being infrequent and manageable. Construction programs were small, construction
financing was easily attainable, and construction schedules were
short. When construction was necessary, it produced economies of
scale. As recently as the late 1960's, economies of scale sufficiently
offset the mild inflation being experienced and there was a trend of
decreasing unit costs of service. Rate cases were infrequent and
the rate of return allowance was just another fact within a narrow
range of debate.
The decade of the 1960's witnessed unprecedented increases in
demand for electrical services. Utilities, by now large enterprises
resulting from the merger of many smaller systems, began enormous construction programs which extended over five-year, and
then ten-year, periods. These programs required vast amounts of
both internal and external funds. In addition, environmental requirements and inflationary pressures increased the costs at an unprecedented rate.' 2 All of these combined to greatly increase the
need for raising equity capital, and the importance of the rate of
return determination in relation to the attractiveness of that capital to investors rose commensurately.
The last two decades have also witnessed radical changes in the
financial world. From the utilities' standpoint, these changes have
dealt a dual blow of rapidly rising interest rates on debt and rapidly declining investor attraction for utility stocks. For example,
by the 1970's, interest rates on utility long-term bonds had more
than doubled since the early 1960's. By 1980, they were triple the
mid-1960's level.' 3 While the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined by 2% from 1965 to 1980, the Dow Jones Utility Average
declined by 30% for the same period.
Finally, the last two decades also witnessed a dramatic change
in the public interest in utility rates. A fundamental change in
12. For example, Minnesota Power & Light Company's most recent coal-fired unit,
Clay Boswell No. 4, cost $786 per kilowatt. The portion of that cost attributable to compliance with environmental regulations accounted for $397 per kilowatt, or over one-half
of the total.
13. The secular trend in interest rates for single-A utility bonds shows increases from
4.5% in the mid-1960's, to 6% in the late 1960's, to 7.2-9.5% in the 1970's, to 10.2% in 1980,
to over 15% in 1981.
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public policy concerning gas and electric utilities began to occur at
the end of the 1960's and perhaps culminated in the Arab oil embargo in 1973. Prior to that time, the public was either silent or
actually favored the expansion of utility services to promote development and to improve the quality of life. Expansion meant economies of scale that reduced the utilities' cost per unit. Today,
inflation and the added cost of environmental protection have reversed the economics of expansion. Public interest shifted attention from the demand for expanded utility service to the impact
upon customers of increasing utility costs. Rate cases became far
more partisan and increasingly complex. They involved not only
the determination of issues between the utility and its customers at
large, but saw intense conflicts between customer classes. There
are many issues raised by customer intervenors as to which the
utility is nearly indifferent, or at least not the primary responding
party. Perhaps even more surprising, intervening parties representing public bodies do not evidence a cohesive "public policy"
and commonly take completely opposing positions on certain
issues.
In proceedings under the Minnesota Public Utilities Act, 14 concepts of social welfare and consumer protection have permeated
the economic principles that stand at the core of the ratemaking
discipline.' 5 The question of fairness, even when defined in terms
of the public interest, must involve a reasonable resolution of the
so-called conflict of interest between investor and consumer. Nowhere does the balancing of this conflict become more critical than
in determining the utilities' fair rate of return. The courts must be
vigilant to correct any unreasonable imbalance and ensure that
fundamental fairness has been observed.
The following sections of this paper examine the courts' role,
first from the standpoint of inherent judicial review, and then from
the constitutional framework of confiscation.
14.

MINN. STAT. ch. 216B (1982).

15. See, e.g., St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
312 Minn. 250, 251 N.W.2d 350 (1977). Also, MINN. STAT. § 216B.03 (1982) provides:
Every rate made, demanded, or received by any public utility, or by any
two or more public utilities jointly, shall be just and reasonable. Rates shall not
be unreasonably preferential, unreasonably prejudicial or discriminatory, but
shall be sufficient, equitable and consistent in application to a class of consumers.
Any doubt as to reasonableness should be resolved in favor of the consumer. For
rate making purposes a public utility may treat two or more municipalities
served by it as a single class wherever the populations are comparable in size or
the conditions of service are similar.
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ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL STANDARDS

Beyond Ghor there was a ciy. A/I its inhabitants were bhnd A king
with his entourage arrived nearby. He had a mighty elephant, which he
used in attack and to increase the people's awe. The populace became
anxious to learn about the elephant, and some sightlessfrom among the
bhnd community ran hkefools tofind it. Since they did not know even the
form or shape of the elephant, they groped sightlessly, gatheringinformation by touching some part of it. Each thought that he knew something,
because he couldfeel a part. When they returned to theirfellow-citizens,
eager groups clustered around them, anxious, misguidedly, to learn the
truth from those who were themselves astray. They asked about theform,
the shape, of the elephant. The man who had reached an ear said, "It is
a large, rough thing, wide and broad,like a rug. " The one who hadfelt
the trunk said- "I have the realfacts about it. It is like a straight and
hollow pipe, awful and destructive. " One who hadfelt its feet and legs
said- "It is mighty andfirm, like a pillar."
The Blind Men and the Elephant (An Ancient Tale)
In exercising its mandate to protect the public interest, we believe that we
should choose the lowest acceptable recommendation (adjusted as appropriate) which falls within the range of reasonableness. We will first
review the testimony of all the witnesses to determine a range of reasonableness. We will then focus on the testimony of the witness who recommends the lowest rate of return to determine ifit is reasonable and has
withstood the tests of cross examination and rebuttal testimony. If we are
satisfied that it is sound, we will adopt it. If the testimony has been
shown to be deficient in certain respects but is nevertheless basically sound,
we will adjust t to remedy the deficiencies and adopt it as adjusted If
we conclude that the testimony is basically unsound, we will reject it and
consider the next lowest recommendation.
North Central Public Service Co.,

Docket No. G-101/GR-77-221
(Minn. P.S.C. Dec. 30, 1978)
By administrative appeal standards we wish to identify that aspect of the scope of judicial review defined by statute and by consideration of separation of powers. Generally, a state's
administrative procedure act specifies the scope of judicial review
on appeal from administrative decisions. For example, many provide that administrative findings may be reversed if not supported
by "substantial evidence." To this standard there is a court declared exception, arising from constitutional separation of powers,
which suggests that administrative decisions that are purely, and
appropriately, legislative in character are not reviewable at all by
the courts, except for abuse of discretion or constitutional violahttp://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol8/iss2/12
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tion, since any greater review would interfere with the legislative
function. The critical questions reviewed in this section, thus, are
(1) whether rate of return determinations are legislative or judicial
in quality and (2) if judicial, how the substantial evidence standard is properly applied to them.
A.

The Legzslative, Quasi-JudicialDistinction

There are marked differences, both in origin and function, between the judicial and the administrative process. Where the
rights of private parties are adjudicated by decision of administrative agencies, however, both the substance and the procedure of
that process must be subject to judicial review to ensure the rudi6
mentary requirements of fair play.'
In Minnesota, utility rate regulation is accomplished by the
Minnesota Public Utilities Commission through the administrative procedures of the Public Utilities Act' 7 and the contested case
16. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1938).
17. MINN. STAT. ch. 216B (1982). The relevant provisions are found at section
216B.08:
The commission is hereby vested with the powers, rights, functions, and jurisdiction to regulate in accordance with the provisions of Laws 1974, Chapter
429 every public utility as defined herein. The exercise of such powers, rights,
functions, and jurisdiction is prescribed as a duty of the commission. The commission is authorized to make rules and regulations in furtherance of the purposes of Laws 1974, Chapter 429;
and section 216B.16;
Subdivision 1. Unless the commission otherwise orders, no public utility
shall change any rate which has been duly established under this chapter, except
upon 60 days notice to the commission. The notice shall include statements of
facts, expert opinions, substantiating documents, and exhibits, supporting the
change requested, and state the change proposed to be made in the rates then in
force and the time when the modified rates will go into effect. The filing utility
shall give written notice, as approved by the commission, of the proposed change
to the governing body of each municipality and county in the area affected. All
proposed changes shall be shown by filing new schedules or shall be plainly indicated upon schedules on file and in force at the time.
Subd. 2. Whenever there is filed with the commission any schedule modifying or resulting in a change in any rates then in force as provided in subdivision 1, the commission may suspend the operation of the schedule by filing with
the schedule of rates and delivering to the affected utility a statement in writing
of its reasons for the suspension at any time before the rates become effective.
The suspension shall not be for a longer period than ten months beyond the
initial filing date. During the suspension the commission shall determine
whether all questions of the reasonableness of the rates requested raised by persons deemed interested or by the administrative division of the department of
public service can be resolved to the satisfaction of the commission. If the cominssionfindr that all signiftant issues raisedhave not been resolved to its satisfaction, or upon
petition by ten percent of the affected customers or 250 a'fectedcustomers, whichever is less, it
shall refer the matter to the office of administrative hearings with instructionsfor a public
hearing as a contested case pursuant to chapter 14, except as otherwise provided in this
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procedures of the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act.' 8
While judicial review is guaranteed by both statutes, 19 the Administrative Procedure Act was adopted "to make uniform the scope
section ....
If the commission does not make a final determination concerning a schedule of
rates withi'n ten months afer the mnitialfiling date, the schedule shall be deemed to have been
approved by the commission. For the purposes of this section, 'Xnal determination "means the
initial decision of the commission and not any order which may be entered by the commission in
response to a petition for rehearing or other further relief The commission may further suspend rates until it determines all those petitions.
Id. § 216B.16 (emphasis added).
18. Id. §§ 14.02(3), 14.60. A contested case is statutorily defined:
Subd. 4. "Contested case" means a proceeding before an agency in which
the legal rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties are required by law or
constitutional right to be determined after an agency hearing. "Contested case"
does not include hearings held by the department of corrections involving the
discipline or transfer of inmates or other hearings related solely to inmate
management.
Id §§ 14.02(3), 15.0411(4).
19. MINN. STAT. § 216B.52 (1982) (emphasis added) provides:
Subdivision 1. Any party to a proceeding before the commission or any other person,
aggrieved by a decision and order and directly aected thereby, shall be entitled to appeal rom
such decision and order of the commission. The proceedings shall be instituted by
serving a notice of appeal personally or by certified mail upon the commission or
one of its members or upon its secretary, and by filing the notice in the office of
the clerk of the district court of Ramsey or of the county in which the appellant
resides or maintains his principal place of business, all within 30 days after the
service of the order and decision of the commission or in cases where a rehearing
is requested within 30 days after service of the order finally disposing of the
application for the rehearing or within 30 days after the final disposition by operation of law of the application for rehearing. The notice shall state the nature
of the appellant's interest, the facts showing that the appellant is aggrieved and
directly affected by the decision, and the grounds upon which the appellant contends that the decision should be reversed or modified. Copies of the notice shall
be served, personally or by certified mail, not later than 30 days after the institution of the appeal, upon all parties who appeared before the commission in the
proceeding in which the order sought to be reviewed was made. The commission
and all parties to the proceeding before it, shall have the right to participate in
the appeal. The court, in its discretion, may permit other interested parties to
intervene.
Subd. 4. The appeal shall be conducted by the court without a jury and
shall be confined to the record, arguments and brief, except that in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the commission testimony thereon may
be taken in the court. The court may affirm the decision of the commission or
may reverse or modify it.
Subd. 5. Any party, including the commission, may secure a review of the
final judgment of the district court by appeal to the supreme court. The appeal
shall be taken in the manner provided by law for appeals from the district court
in other civil cases, except that the time for appeal shall be limited to 30 days
from the notice of entry of the judgment.
MINN. STAT. § 14.63 (1982) provides:
Any person aggrieved by a final decision in a contested case is entitled to
judicial review of the decision under the provisions of sections 14.63 to 14.68, but
nothing in sections 14.63 to 14.68 shall be deemed to prevent resort to other
means of review, redress, relief, or trial de novo provided by law now or hereafter
enacted. A petition by an aggrieved person for judicial review under sections
14.63 to 14.68 must be filed with the district court and served on the agency not
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of judicial review of the decisions of all administrative factfinding
agencies."120 Its purpose is to afford the affected party an independent judicial analysis of whether the administrative process
offered the basic fairness and propriety required in determining
the parties' rights and obligations. 2 ' The scope of review is established by Minnesota Statutes, section 14.69, which provides that
the reviewing court
may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for
further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if
the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been
prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the
agency; or
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) Affected by other error of law; or
(e) Unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or
22
(f) Arbitrary or capricious.
Which of the cited standards will form the basis for the court's
review turns, in the first instance, on what function the administrative agency performed. A general statement of the governing standard can be found in this pronouncement in Reserve Mining Co. v.

Herbst:23
We said in Minneapohs Van that the provisions of Minn. St.
[14.69] of the Administrative Procedure Act, adopted by the
legislature following the Dahlen case, evidenced an intent "to
make uniform the scope of judicial review of the decisions of all
administrative factfinding agencies," including those expressly
more than 30 days after the party receives the final decision and order of the
agency.
MINN. STAT. § 14.68 (1982) provides:
The review shall be conducted by a court without a jury and shall be confined to the record, except that in cases of alleged irregularities in procedure, not
shown in the record, testimony thereon may be taken in the court. The court
shall, upon request, hear oral argument and receive written briefs. Except as
otherwise provided all proceedings shall be conducted according to the rules of
civil procedure.
20. Minneapolis Van & Warehouse Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co., 288
Minn. 294, 298, 180 N.W.2d 175, 177 (1970) (emphasis added).
21. Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977); Bryan v. Community State Bank of Bloomington, 285 Minn. 226, 172 N.W.2d 771 (1969).
22. MINN. STAT. § 14.69 (1982).
23. 256 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1977).
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excluded from the definition of "agency" by Minn. St. [14.02,
subd. 2.]. However, even that definition does not exclude either
the DNR or PCA. Our subsequent decisions have uniformly
applied the "substantial evidence" rule with respect to findings
of fact by administrative agencies. In the St. PaulArea Chamber
of Commerce decision, which was a rate case decided by the Public Service Commission, we reiterated with approval what we
said in Minneapolis Van, distinguishing between judcialfunctions in
reviewthgfactual matters and the more hmited latitude allowed in reviewing legislative decisions of administrative agencies where socialpolicy is
involved.

24

The distinction between matters of social policy, inherently legislative, and the quasi-judicial factfinding process alluded to in Reserve Mining Co., is the key determinant of scope of review and was
clearly designated as the line of demarcation for commission decisions. In St. PaulArea Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota Public Service
Commission,25 the court said:
Combining this rule with that adopted above for factual determinations, we may summarize as follows:
(a) When the Public Service Commission acts in a judicial
capacity as a factfinder, receives evidence in order to make factual conclusions, and weighs that evidence as would a judge in
a court trial, it will be held on review to the substantial-evidence standard.
(b) When the Public Service Commission acts in a legislative capacity as in rate increase allocations, balancing both cost
and noncost factors and making choices among public policy
alternatives, its decisions will be upheld unless shown to be in
excess of statutory authority or resulting in unjust, unreasona2 6
ble, or discriminatory rates by clear and convincing evidence.
B.

Application to Rate of Return Calculations
1.

Pre-Hibbing Taconite

Prior to Hibbing Taconite Co. v. Minnesota Public Service Commission,27 the question of the application of these standards to rate of
return on equity determinations had not been directly addressed
by the Minnesota Supreme Court. In fact, the commission evi24.
25.
26.
27.

Id at 826 (emphasis added).
312 Minn. 250, 251 N.W.2d 350 (1977).
Id. at 262, 251 N.W.2d at 358.
302 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. 1980).
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dently perceived indirect references by the court to endorse a legislative standard.
Those indirect references were drawn by the commission from
two earlier cases where the determination of rate of return on common equity was not before the court. The first was Northwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. State ,28 where the court, in the same breath as
its discussion of the fair rate of return, made the general statement:
We have previously noted that the fixing of a fair rate of return
cannot be determined with precision, since it is not derived
from a formula, but must be reached through the exercise of a
reasonable judgment, applying the criteria to which we have
referred. Ratemaking is a legislative and not a judicialfunction. In
complex cases such as this, the court should, and does, accord
the commission great deference in reviewing its decision. The
rates fixed by the commission are presumed to be reasonable
and just until the contrary is shown by clear and convincing
evidence. In this area, the court's only function is to protect
constitutional rights and not to substitute its own judgment for
29
that of the commission.

This language was embellished in St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota Public Service Commission ,30 when the court, in an
appeal that considered rate design, not rate of return, stated, "As
we have said in previous cases of this kind, ratemaking is an inherent legislative function not to be exercised by the courts. . . . We
recently reaffirmed this principle in Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v.
State." 3 1 The court went on to reconcile Northwestern Bell with Minneapolis Van & Warehouse v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse ,32 as follows:
Taken together, these two decisions made the substantial-evidence test of § [14.69] applicable to commission decisions only
when it is acting in a quasi-judicial manner, in a role similar to
that of a trial judge sitting without a jury. In cases where the
commission acts primarily in a judicial capacity, that is, hearing the
views of opposing sides presented in the form of written and oral testimony, examining the record, and makingfindings offact, the administrative process is best served by allowing the district court to apply the
substantialevidence standardon review. This is so because in such a
case the district judge is able to review all of the evidence as he
would in any trial and can, within the knowledge parameters of
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

299 Minn. 1, 216 N.W.2d 841 (1974).
Id at 27-28, 216 N.W.2d at 857 (emphasis added).
312 Minn. 250, 251 N.W.2d 350 (1977).
Id at 254, 251 N.W.2d at 353-54 (citations omitted).
288 Minn. 294, 180 N.W.2d 175 (1970).
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his own expertise, determine whether or not each finding is supported by substantial evidence. There is no policy reason why
the commission's finding should not be required to satisfy the
substantial-evidence test on this issue. The absence of challenge to this aspect of the commission's decision indicates the
parties are satisfied it was supported by substantial evidence.
As to rate allocations, the teaching of Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. State remains the law: "The rates fixed by the commission are presumed to be reasonable and just until the
contrary is shown by clear and convincing evidence." The
function of the district court is not to "substitute its own judgment for that of the commission," but is only to ensure that the
rate structure adopted by the commission is not "unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory.

2.

' 33

The North Central Doctrine

Seizing upon its perception of the implied license granted by
Northwestern Bell and St. PaulArea, the commission, within months
of the St. PaulArea opinion, made a decisive move to sweep rate of
return on equity determinations under the legislative umbrella. In
an effort to standardize this complex rate case procedure, the commission announced a new approach in 1977 for determining the
appropriate return on common equity in North CentralPublic Service
Co.

34

Fixing the rate of return on common equity is a legislative process. In
the ideal sense the Commission's obligation is to insure that a
Company has the opportunity to earn as much as it needs to
maintain its financial integrity and provide adequate service
and not a penny more. In exercising its mandate to protect the
public interest, we believe that we should choose the lowest acceptable recommendation (adjusted as appropriate) which falls
within the range of reasonableness. We will first review the testimony of all the witnesses to determine a range of reasonableness. We will then focus on the testimony of the witness who
recommends the lowest rate of return to determine if it is reasonable and has withstood the tests of cross examination and
rebuttal testimony. If we are satisfied that it is sound, we will
adopt it. If the testimony has been shown to be deficient in
certain respects but is nevertheless basically sound, we will ad33. St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 312
Minn. 250, 259-60, 251 N.W.2d 350, 356-57 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
34. Docket No. G-101/GR-77-221 (Minn. P.S.C. Dec. 30, 1978).
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just it to remedy the deficiencies and adopt it as adjusted. If we
reject
conclude that the testimony is basically unsound we will
35
it and consider the next lowest recommendation, etc.
Casting the rate of return as legislative, whether done to avoid
in-depth judicial scrutiny or to make its decision process easier,
was a fundamental mistake that had a costly impact on utilities.
While formulated in the context of a rate case, this doctrine attained the status of a rule and was consistently followed in all
cases. 36 In fact, by the time the commission heard the 1977 Minnesota Power & Light Co. case, it had become so confident in the viability of its North Central doctrine that it fashioned a sporting
context for its application:
We shall continue to follow the North Central method here. We
turn then to the question of whether either [company witness]
Mr. Benderly or [Staff witness] Mr. Miller were so badly pummeled in cross-examination or through rebuttal testimony that
a knockout was scored. After reviewing their testimony in its entirety, we conclude that, while each suffered several punishing
blows, neither was incapacitated.
Accordingly, we will analyze Mr. Miller's discounted cash
why we think we can
flow analysis in some detail to explain
37
adjustments.
certain
with
it
accept
Running parallel to the North Central doctrine was the commission's increased reliance upon and progressively narrower application of the Discounted Cash Flow formula. 38 Beginning in June
1977, with Interstate Power Co. ,39 the commission announced its intention to rely more heavily on DCF and, in the process, to look
more narrowly at the usual adjustment for market pressure and
the costs of issuing new common stock.
35. Id at 31 (emphasis added).
36. Typical language found in commission orders was as follows: "In accordance
with our approach for determining the appropriate cost of equity as set forth in the North
Central case, we will first focus our attention upon the testimony of the witness recommending the lowest return." Minnesota Power & Light Co., Docket No. E-015/GR-78-514
(Minn. P.S.C. Apr. 9, 1979), at 53 (footnote omitted).
37. Minnesota Power & Light Co., Docket No. E-015/GR-77-360 (Minn. P.S.C. Feb.
3, 1978), at 26 (emphasis added).
38. See, e.g., Otter Tail Power Co., Docket No. E-01 7/GR-77-716 (Minn. P.S.C. Aug.
1, 1978), at 34-37 (Sasseville, C., dissenting).
39. Docket No. E-OOI/GR-76-1826 (Minn. P.S.C. June 30, 1977), at 14-15.
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A Case Study Impact

The combination of these policies had a dramatic impact upon
rate of return determinations. The experience of at least one utility under this doctrine is illuminating.
Minnesota Power and Light Company (MP&L) is a Duluthbased, investor-owned electric utility with a service area which extends over 26,000 square miles in fifteen counties in central and
northeastern Minnesota. It serves Minnesota's famous Iron
Range, vast forested and recreational areas, and active freshwater
and ocean shipping port facilities on Lake Superior. This area has
a concentration of industrial facilities engaged in iron ore and taconite extraction and processing, manufacture of paper and pulp
products, and manufacture of iron and steel products, with lake
shipping and associated storage of grain and ore. All of these industries use substantial amounts of electrical energy, thus giving
the company a unique predominance of sales of energy to large
industrial users.
Simultaneous with the advent of commission regulation in 1975,
the predominance of consumption of electrical energy by taconite
processing facilities was accelerating. Beginning in 1973, a
number of planned expansions of taconite processing facilities in
the service area were announced, with additional announcements
in 1974. From a peak load of approximately 700,000 kilowatts in
1975, the committed and anticipated demand for additional energy pushed the projected 1980-81 system peak to 1.5 million kilowatts, a 100% increase during a five-year period. This increase
required MP&L to undertake a massive construction program
with attendant needs for huge amounts of capital. Rate cases filed
in 1976, 1977, and 1978 reflected these conditions. A comparison
of the 1976 MP&L rate case, decided prior to the adoption of the
North Central doctrine, with the 1977 and 1978 cases illustrates the
detrimental impact of the doctrine on rate of return.
Two primary expert witnesses testified in all three proceedings-Mr. Miller on behalf of the Staff and Mr. Benderly on behalf of MP&L. When not bound by the narrow process of North
Central, the commission expressed some restraint concerning its
rate of return function, stating, "Within established legal constraints, the Commission has a certain degree of latitude to exercise its judgment and discretion in determining an appropriate
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rate of return to common equity.
Since it had not yet restricted itself to focus on the testimony of
the witness with the lowest recommendation, the commission was
free to find Mr. Benderly's testimony more persuasive:
The Examiner found Mr. Benderly's [MP&L's witness] analysis
most convincing and found MP&L entitled to 13.5 percent rate
of return on common equity allowing for a market price 10 percent in excess of book value and also allowing 0.5 percent rate
of return for the perceived risks of Square Butte. The Commission is also inclined to accept the rate of return analysis of Mr.
Benderly as most convincing and notes that its results do not
conflict entirely with those of Mr. Hong and are only slightly
above the range established by Mr. Miller. The Commission
however is not convinced of the wisdom of placing MP&L on
the thin edge of being forced to realize net proceeds from sales
of common equity below book value and thus finds 13.25 percent rather than41 13.05 percent to be the appropriate cost of
common equity.
The order in the 1977 case came only fourteen months later.
Despite similar testimony from the same two rate of return witnesses-both showing that the cost of equity had increased-the
commission reduced the allowance, illustrating the practical effect
of its self-imposed bondage to North Central. No longer observing
"established legal constraints," it flatly stated that "[f]ixing the
rate of return on common equity is a legislative process." ' 42 Without permitting itself the opportunity to find Mr. Benderly's analysis the most convincing, it limited its review to the testimony of
Mr. Miller, solely because it presented the lowest recommendation. The process, it stated, was to analyze Mr. Miller's discounted
cash flow analysis in order to "explain why we think we can accept
'43
it with certain adjustments.
Not surprisingly, the result of this radically altered process was a
reduction in return on common equity from 13.25% to 13%, in
spite of the fact that the uncontradicted testimony showed that the
cost of capital had increased since 1976 because MP&L's need for
external funds had increased; new common offerings were planned
at greater frequency; the portion of Construction Work In Progress
40. Minnesota Power & Light Co., Docket No. E-015/GR-76-408 (Minn. P.S.C. Dec.
18, 1976), at 30.
41. Id at 35.
42. Minnesota Power & Light Co., Docket No. E-015/GR-77-360 (Minn. P.S.C. Feb.
3, 1978), at 26 (quoting the North Central doctrine).
43. Id
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(CWIP) in rate base had quadrupled; the percentage of Allowance
for Funds Used During Construction (AFUDC) in income had
quadrupled; MP&L's coverage ratios were declining; and even Mr.
Miller's cost of equity findings had come up between the two
years. No logical factor could explain the decrease except blind
adherence to North Central.
MP&L sought judicial review and the Minnesota Supreme

44
Court, in Hbbing Taconite Co. v. Minnesota Pubhc Service Commisston
and Minnesota Power & Light Co. v. Minnesota Pub/ic Service Commission ,'45focused for the first time on the precise question of the scope

of administrative review of a rate of return on equity determination. These decisions judicially clarified that fixing the rate of return placed the commission in a quasi-judicial capacity as a fact
finder and properly subjected that role to review on the substantial
evidence standard.

. Fixing the Rate of Return on Common Equity is a Quasi-judicial
Function
The commission's reading of Northwestern Bell and St. Paul Area
had been mistaken. The court in Northwestern Bell did not rule that
fixing the rate of return was a legislative function. More closely
examined, it stated two separate propositions: one, that fixing the
return must be accomplished through the exercise of reasonable
judgment and, two, that "ratemaking" is a legislative function.
While the latter proposition is generally accepted, it does not mean
that all parts of the ratemaking process are legislative.
Professor Davis had earlier provided a more precise analysis:
[Any proceeding, whether judicial or legislative and whether
adjudication or rule making, may involve a plurality of tasks,
such as finding adjudicative facts, finding legislative facts, interpreting law, creating law, making policy, or exercising discretion, and the proper procedure has to reflect each one of
those tasks, not the whole proceeding.
Letting the choice of procedure depend upon characterization
of a whole proceeding as "judicial," "legislative," "adjudication," or "rulemaking" involves crude thinking that fails even
to begin to reach the true reasons that should control the selec46
tion of the appropriate procedure.
44. 302 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. 1980).
45. 310 N.W.2d 686 (Minn. 1981).
46. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
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Within this context, determinations of rate of return on equity
are quasi-judicial. They are determinations of a "cost" to be allowed. A determination of the cost cannot, by definition, be influenced by non-cost, policy factors. There are no public policy
alternatives involved in the process of determining what a cost is.
Fixing the rate of return, like determining the cost of labor or fuel,
is based on evidence and is determined by a process akin to that
followed by a judge sitting without a jury; establishing the weight
of expert recommendation according to its own merits and persuasiveness and arriving at the court's independent judgment of the
truth.
This conclusion is easily reconciled with S1. PaulArea by critical
focus on the following language:
As our previous discussion makes clear, however, rate allocation
is not a judicial or quasi-judicial function. Once revenue requirements have been determined it remains to decide how, and from

whom, the additional revenue is to be obtained. It is at this
point that many countervailing considerations come into
play.

47

The language, "Once revenue requirements have been determined," is the line of demarcation. Following such determination
the commission must understandably exercise its legislative judgment in carefully distributing the increased revenue requirement
among the various customer classes and in the process resolve difficult social policy questions such as senior-citizen and fixed-income
ratemaking.
In contrast, a proper concept of a rate of return on equity is that
it is one of the unavoidable "costs" of doing business--comparable
with operating expenses, depreciation, and taxes. It provides for
the costs of obtaining capital, just as operating expenses provide
for the costs of obtaining materials and supplies, labor, and government services (through taxes).
In short, the rate of return on equity is a fact, albeit a complex
fact. It is susceptible of evidentiary proof and requires the regulator to hear the testimony of economic witnesses on the state of the
economy, the attitudes of investors, the cost of attracting capital,
the relative risk of the investment, and other related factors. These
precise distinction is often drawn in federal cases between "adjudicative facts" and "legislative facts." See, e.g., Patagonia Corp. v. Board of Governors, 417 F.2d 803, 816 (9th Cir.
1975).
47. St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 312
Minn. 250, 260, 251 N.W.2d 350, 357 (1977) (emphasis added).
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matters are legal and evidentiary determinations and fall squarely
within the language in St. Paul Area:
In cases where the commission acts primarily in a judicial capacity, that is, hearing the views of the opposing sides presented
in the form of written and oral testimony, examining the record, and making findings of fact, the administrative process is
best served by allowing the district court to apply the substantial evidence standard on review. This is so because in such a
case the district judge is able to review all of the evidence as he
would be in any trial and can, within the knowledge parameters of his own expertise, determine whether or not each finding
48
is supported by substantial evidence.

The North Central doctrine had created a process whereby the
commission systematically and intentionally ignored major segments of the testimony. While designed to look to all testimony to
establish a range of reasonable rates of return, that step was meaningless since the testimony which supported the high end of the
range was, for that sole reason, excluded from further consideration unless all other testimony in the record was "so badly pummeled in cross examination or through rebuttal testimony that a
knockout was scored."'4 9 In analyzing the lowest recommendation
under this "knockout" standard, no consideration was given to the
direct testimony of other witnesses-only "cross examination" and
"rebuttal testimony." The commission, by de facto rule, had effectively prevented itself from giving reasoned consideration to any
data or opinions provided by the company's witnesses.
This procedure denied the company's right to a fair hearing-it
made a mockery of the company's nominal opportunity to present
evidence and argument and it deprived the commission of the opportunity to reach a reasoned judgment based upon all of the
facts. It was tantamount to instructing a jury, in a condemnation
case, that while the plaintiff is permitted to put expert appraisals
on record, the jury may only consider the evidence which tends to
prove the lowest value. It, in essence, institutionalized a process
whereby the truth about an elephant would be adjudicated conclusively upon the basis of the description of one blind man who
had reached an ear.
In reviewing these principles in Hibbing Taconite, the court recog48. Id at 259-60, 51 N.W.2d at 356.
49. Minnesota Power & Light Co., Docket No. E-015/GR-77-360 (Minn. P.S.C. Feb.
3, 1978), at 26.
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nized that clarification was necessary and that it must apply two
different scopes of review:
Although the court has set forth these general principles, when
considering rate cases the court has not been precise in its use of
terminology. The single term "ratemaking" has been used to
describe what is really two separate functions-(l) the establishment of a rate of return, which is a quasi-judicial function,
and (2) the allocation of rates among various classes of utility
customers, which is a legislative function. The court's failure to
be more precise when discussing the two phases of ratemaking
has led to the inappropriate statement that "ratemaking is a
legislative process."
The St. PaulChamber case enunciated the PSC's two functions
and the related standards of review. In appl'ig those standards,
we now hold that the establishment of a rate of return involves a factual
determination which the courts will review under the substantialevidence
standard. When the PSC allocates rates among classes of customers, it acts in a legislative capacity and the courts will uphold the PSC's decision unless it exceeds the PSC's statutory
authority or results in unjust, unreasonable, or discriminatory
rates by clear and convincing evidence. Here, the trial court
correctly concluded that it should apply the substantial evidence test when reviewing the PSC's determination of MPL's
50
rate of return.
Having recognized the substantial evidence standard, it became
readily apparent that the North Central doctrine must fall. Its
"knockout" test applied to the low ball testimony did not satisfy
the "substantial evidence" requirement. Clearly, a witness's testimony could withstand a "knockout"-implying a burden to eliminate it beyond a reasonable doubt-and yet fall far short of
"substantial evidence in view of the entire record," as required by
Minnesota Statutes, section 14.69(e).
The attempt to standardize complex rate case procedures had
failed the fairness concepts embodied in the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act and was properly dismantled by the court:
We note that this policy is no doubt designed to comply with
the statutory requirement that the PSC ensure that utility rates
are just and reasonable and that "[a]ny doubt as to the reasonableness should be resolved in favor of the consumer." Minn.
Stat. § 216B.03 (1978). The North Central doctrine is, however,
not an adequate method to achieve that goal. Chapter 216B
50. 302 N.W.2d at 9.
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gives to the PSC the duty as well as the power to set a just and
reasonable rate after a full review of evidence and testimony.
To peg an establishedrate to a rate advocatedby any one ofseveral expert
witnesses is an arbitrary delegation of that duty. The use of the North
Central doctrine is impermissible. Nonetheless, a review of the record satisfies us that the PSC did not apply the doctrine in this
case, even though it announced that it was following the doctrine. Reversal on this ground is not required. 51
In effect, Hibbing Taconite merely recognized that the North Central doctrine disregarded the first half of the mandate to the commission, set forth in Minneapoli's Street Railway Co. v. City of
Minneapolis :52

The order of the commission should be recognized as the product of expert judgment which carries a presumption of validity.
Such an order will not be disturbed where it appears that the
commission has (1) fairly considered the investor's interest with
concern for the financial integrity of the company whose rates
are being regulated so as to provide a return commensurate
with returns or investments of other enterprises having corresponding risks, so as to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise and to maintain its credit and attract
capital; and (2) has fairly balanced those considerations against
the just interests of the public who are required to pay the fares
53
imposed.
Any lingering doubt was dispelled in the 1978 MP&L case, Min54
nesota Power & Light Co. v. Minnesota Public Service Commission ,
which involved a commission decision made before the court's ruling in Hibbing Taconite had been announced. On appeal the commission no longer urged the validity of North Central, but in fact
defended its order upon the ground that, while it had announced
adherence to North Central, it had not in fact applied it.
5.

Related Precedent

The result in Hibbing Taconite is consistent with federal decisions
in analogous areas and with quasi-judicial legislative distinctions
in other areas of Minnesota law. A more precise distinction is
often drawn in federal cases between "adjudicative facts" and
"legislative facts." For example, in PatagoniaCorp. v. Boardof Gover51. Id. at 11.

52. 251 Minn. 43, 86 N.W.2d 657 (1957).
53. Id at 72-73, 86 N.W.2d at 676.
54. 310 N.W.2d 686 (1981).
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nors, 55 the court stated:
Patagonia's application for a section 1841(d)(3) controlling influence determination confronts the Board with a question of
"adjudicative," not "legislative," fact. In the context of administrative law, legislative facts are those that affect an industry as
a whole. An agency may resolve legislative questions through
rule-making, relying on generalized data concerning an industry, the agency's special expertise, and policy considerations.
The rules thereby evolved may be applied to particularized situations without formal hearings. Adjudicative facts are those
that immediately affect only specific litigants. Questions of adjudicative fact must be resolved on the basis of the evidentiary
submissions of the parties. They are the types of questions that
in a trial would normally be submitted to a jury, or to a judge
56
as the finder of facts.

It is also consistent with other pronouncements of the Minnesota
Supreme Court on commission authority. 57 In In re Signal De'vegy
Service, Inc. ,58 the court stated:
The substantial evidence test is applicable to commission decisions when it is acting in a quasi-judicial manner; that is, when
the commission hears the view of opposing sides presented in
the form of written and oral testimony, examines the record
59
and makes findings of fact.

In land use law, where analogous issues arise during judicial review of municipal proceedings, the court has long enforced a similar standard. When acting in a legislative capacity, a municipal
council may consider facts within its expertise and common knowledge and is not limited to considering only matters on which substantial evidence has been presented.
Thus, when a city council adopts or amends a zoning ordinance,
its actions affect an open class of individuals and it therefore is
acting in a legislative capacity. When a council considers whether
to grant or deny a permit, its actions no longer bear upon an open
class but directly on the particular interests of the applicant and
the council is acting in a judicial capacity. 60 The distinction was
55. 517 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1975).
56. Id. at 816, citlig I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 7.02 (1958).
57. See, e.g., Arvig Tel. Co. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 270 N.W.2d 111 (Minn.
1978).
58. 288 N.W.2d 707 (Minn. 1980).
59. Id at 710.
60. Barton Contracting Co. v. City of Afton, 268 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. 1978); Sun
Oil Co. v. Village of New Hope, 300 Minn. 326, 333, 200 N.W.2d 256, 260-61 (1974).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1982

25

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1982], Art. 12
WILLIAM MTCtHELL LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 8

recently reaffirmed in Honn v. City of Coon Rapids:6 1
Nevertheless, while the reasonableness standard is the same for
all zoning matters, the nature of the matter under review has a
bearing on what is reasonable. In enacting a zoning ordinance
or in amending an ordinance to rezone, the approach is legislative; what is involved is a kind of municipal planning in which
a wide range of value judgments is considered. On the other
hand, in granting or denying a special use permit, the inquiry is
more judicial in character since the zoning authority is applying specific use standards set by the zoning ordinance to a par62
ticular individual use.
6.

The Substantial Evidence Rule

Since the determination of rate of return on equity is a quasijudicial function, it is subject to judicial review under the normal
scope provided by the Administrative Procedures Act:
[T]he Court may. . . reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or
decisions are:
(e) Unsupported by substantialevidence in view of the entire record
63
as submitted.
The determination that substantial evidence is required does
not, obviously, automatically resolve all issues. Since every determination is, hopefully, based upon some evidence, it remains to
determine what quality of evidence is sufficient to constitute
substantial.
While H'bbing Taconite clearly established the applicability of the
substantial evidence standard, it gave no definition of that standard. Earlier decisions do provide some direction, however. The
most complete statement appeared in Minneapolis Van & Warehouse

Co. v. St. Paul Terminal Warehouse Co. :64
The statutory rule also settles any doubt of our conformity with
the majority of courts, both state and Federal, in accepting the
substantial-evidence rule as the rule governing the scope of all
judicial review of evidence supporting factual findings of administrative agencies. 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise,
61.

313 N.W.2d 409 (Minn.1981).

62. Id.at 417.
63. MINN. STAT. § 14.69 (1982) (emphasis added).
64. 288 Minn. 294, 180 N.W.2d 175 (1970).
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§ 29.11. As Professor Davis points out in chapter 29 of his comprehensive treatment of this subject matter, substantial evidence is more than "a scintilla" and is "such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." § 29.02. The main inquiry by the district court is
"whether on the record * * * [the commission] could reason-

ably make the finding." § 29.01. While the test is "vague,
rather than precise" and the "intensity of review" may vary
from case to case, § 29.11, the "test is the same as the test on
review of a jury verdict, but the review is narrower than the
review of the findings of a judge sitting without a jury,"
§ 29.01, the latter being governed by the "clearly erroneous"
test. § 29.11. The burden is upon the appellant to establish
that the findings of the commission are not supported by the
evidence in the record, considered in its entirety. If the evidence is conflicting or the undisputed facts permit more than
one inference to be drawn, the findings of the commission may
not be upset and the district court may not substitute its judg65
ment for that of the commission.
Notably, the substantial evidence rule requires a review of the
"whole record." This requirement means that the court, and
therefore the commission, may not look exclusively to the testimony of one party or one witness and ignore other evidence which
may weaken or destroy that testimony. Thus, in Hhbbing Taconi'te,
the court found that the commission's total reliance on the rate of
return recommendation of one witness, dictated by the commission's adherence to its North Central rule, did not satisfy the substantial evidence rule since that recommendation was not credible
66
in light of other evidence in the record.
The Minnesota view appears consistent with the scope of review
of decisions under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, reviewed by Professor Davis as follows:
The Administrative Procedure Act provides in section 10(e)
that "the court shall review the whole record or such portions
thereof as may be cited by any party." The Senate and House
committees explained: "The requirement of review 'upon the
whole record' means that courts may not look only to the case
presented by one party, since other evidence may weaken or
even indisputably destroy that case." The Supreme Court
made clear in the Universal Camera opinion that it takes liter65. Id at 298-99, 180 N.W.2d at 177-78 (footnote omitted).
66. Hibbing Taconite Co. v. Minnesota Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 302 N.W.2d 5, 12
(1980).
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ally both the words of the statute and the words of the committee reports. The law of review on the whole record is thus
entirely free from doubt in the federal courts.
The only federal problem about review on the whole record
is the curiously cluttered one of what was the law before enactment of the APA in 1946. It is hardto see how sensiblejudges could
concevably appraise the substantiality of evidence t a record without
looking at the evidence on both sides, for evidence has significance only in
a context, not in the abstract. As ProfessorJaffeewrote as long ago as
1943: "Obviously responsible men would not exercise theirjudgment on
only that part of the evidence that looks in one direction, the rationalityor
substantiality of a conclusion can only be evaluated in the light of the
wholefact situation or so much of it as appears. Evidence which may
be logically substantial in isolation may be deprived of much of
its character or its claim to credibility when considered with
'67
other evidence."
C

Conclusion: Administrative Review

The substantial evidence rule is clearly established in Minnesota
as the appropriate scope of judicial review of administrative determinations of rate of return on equity. The North Central doctrine is
clearly and appropriately outlawed.
Unlike the approach of the City of Ghor, utilizing the blind
men to describe the elephant, the commission's determination of
the rate of return on equity must search for the whole truth. It
should fulfill the criteria endorsed in the Massachusetts case of Boston Edison Co. v. Department of Public Utilities:68
The Department did not base its decision on the testimony of
any one witness. Rather, the Department's written decision
evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each witness's testimony, culingfrom the mass of evidence those elements which, we agree,
are worthy of weight. In so doing, the Departmentbased its cost of equity
judgment on a reasoned composite of all the evidence. That is a process
69
which this court has strongly encouraged.
This requirement for an exercise of regulatory judgment of multiple factors is clearly consistent with the spirit of the constitutional standards discussed next. In Bluefield Water Works &
Improvement Co. v. Pubhc Service Commi'sson ,7 the United States
67. 4 K. DAvis, supra note 56, § 29.03, at 127 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
68. 375 Mass. 1, 375 N.E.2d 305 (1978).
69. d at 12, 375 N.E.2d at 314-15 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
70. 262 U.S. 679 (1923).
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Supreme Court said that "[w]hat annual rate will constitute just
compensation depends upon many circumstances and must be determined by the exercise of a fair and enlightenedjudgment, having regardto all relevantfacts. '' 7 'We will next discuss what information is
necessary for "fair and enlightened judgment."
IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

A certain man was believed to have died and was being preparedfor burial, when he revived He sat up, but was so shocked at the scene around
him that he fanted He was put in a coffin and thefuneralparty set off
for the cemetery. Just as they arrivedat the grave, he regainedconsciousness, lifted the coffn lid and criedout for help. 'It is not possible that he
has revived''said the mourners, 'because he was certifieddead by competent experts.' 'But lam alive, 'shouted the man. He appealedto a wellknown and impartialscientist andjurisprudentwho was present. Just a
moment, 'said the expert. He then turned to the mourners, counting them,
'Now we have heardwhat the allegeddeceased has had to say. You fift)
witnesses tell me what you regardas the truth.' 'He is dead,' said the
witnesses. 'Bury him,' said the expert. And so he was buried
An Anctent TalefThe Commission's order does not become suspect by reason of the fact it
is challenged It is the product of expertjudgment which carries a presumption of validity and he who would upset the rate order under the Act,
carries the heavy burden ofmaking a convincing showing that it is invalid
because it is unjust and unreasonablein its consequences.
FederalPower Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.

320 U.S. 591 (1944)
If the rate of return on equity fixed by the commission is inadequate, the result is unconstitutional confiscation of the utility's
property. What is adequate? The Bluefield decision of the United
States Supreme Court, cited hundred of times on this subject,
stated the broad test as follows:
What annual rate will constitute just compensation depends
upon many circumstances and must be determined by the exercise of a fair and enlightened judgment, having regard to all
relevant facts. A public utility is entitled to such rates as will
permit it to earn a return on the value of the property which it
employs for the convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at the same time and in the same general part
of the country on investments in other business undertakings
which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties;
71. Id at 692 (emphasis added).
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but it has no constitutional right to profits such as are realized
or anticipated in highly profitable enterprises for speculative
venture. The return should be reasonably sufficient to assure
confidence in the financial soundness of the utility and should
be adequate, under efficient and economical management, to
maintain and support its credit and enable it to raise the money
necessary for the proper discharge of its public duties. A rate of
return may be reasonable at one time and become too high or
too low by changes affecting opportunities for investment, the
72
money market and business condition generally.

This test appears simple and dispositive. In application, it is
abstract and subjective. Further, as a result of the apparent pulling back by the Court in FederalPower Commission v. Hope Natural
Gas Co. ,73 by approving any method so long as the "end result" is
not unjust,7 4 many a utility has felt itself "buried alive" because of

inability to obtain objective review of the "expert judgment" of
the administrative body. Further, the radical changes in the utility industry and the national economy since the last major judicial
pronouncements on confiscation-pre-1945-make these broad
standards insufficiently focused to address the complexity of the
1980's. The development of more detailed criteria and some identifying marks of confiscation is critically needed.
The discussion is launched by reviewing some of the underlying
principles that surround the question of confiscation. Next, we
trace the journey of the confiscation standard to test the adequacy
of its depth and breadth. Finally, some identifying marks by
which confiscation can and should be judged in the real world of
today are proposed.
A.

General Prnciples

The enforcement of rates which are unreasonably low or confiscatory is a violation of the constitutional requirements of due process-no rate may be enforced by public authority which compels
the utility to operate its property for public convenience without
just compensation. 75 A return may become confiscatory for any
72. Id at 692-93.

73. 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
74. Id at 602.
75. Some early cases also found violation of constitutional requirements of equal protection of the laws where a regulated company was not permitted to earn "reasonable
profits" while other industries were permitted to do so. See, e.g. , Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry.
v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418,459 (1890). Generally, however, constitutional review is based
upon the due process clause.
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one of several reasons-such as:
(1) non-recognition-and thus non-recovery--of some item of
necessary expenses, such as taxes or depreciation;
(2) improper exclusion from rate base of some item of investment which is required for utility operation;
(3) miscalculation of the company's capital structure so as to
give incorrect weighting to the debt, preferred stock, and equity
components;
(4) understatement of debt costs; or
(5) inadequate allowance for the return on common equity.
The focus of this article is, of course, the last item: confiscation
which occurs because the rate of return fixed by the commission is
too low.
No rule as to what constitutes a nonconfiscatory rate may be
laid down to be applied uniformly to all utilities under all circumstances. Each utility presents an individual situation which requires review of all relevant facts in light of that situation and the
utility's requirements and opportunities. 76 It is also frequently
said that what will constitute a fair return in a given case is not
capable of exact mathematical demonstration, but is a matter of
judgment. 77 Of course, the utility is never guaranteed that it will
actually earn the fair return allowed, but rather is entitled to have
its rates established to give it the opportunzt to actually earn that
78
fair return.
There has been considerable debate over the years as to whether
a nonconfiscatory rate equals a "reasonable" rate. For example,
when a statute requires a "fair" or "reasonable" rate of return,
does it impose a higher standard than simply a rate which is not
constitutionally confiscatory? A body of cases distinguishes between the absolute minimum of a confiscatory standard and the
standard of reasonableness. 79 On the other hand, many courts and
commissions use the two terms interchangeably, such as in Bluefed, where the Court stated, "Rates which are not sufficient to
76. See, e.g., Smith v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 282 U.S. 133 (1930).
77. See, e.g., Northwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 299 Minn. 1, 27, 216 N.W.2d 841,
857 (1974).
78. See Bluefield Water Works & Improvement Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S.
679, 692 (1923) ("A public utility is entitled to such rate as will penmi it to earn a fair
return." (emphasis added)).
79. See, e.g., Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 89 P.U.R. (N.S.) 414 (Cal. P.U.C. 1950); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 87 P.U.R. (N.S.) 97 (Ark. P.S.C. 1951); People's Gas Light & Coke
Co. v. Slattery, 25 N.E.2d 482 (II. 1939).
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yield a reasonable return on the value of the property used at the
time it is being used to render the service are unjust, unreasonable,
and confiscatory." ' 0
In the turn of the century cases, this debate centered on whether
confiscation existed when the rates provided some earnings above
expenses, albeit modest. Clearly, rates that required the utility to
operate at a loss were confiscatory. The absence of any further
objective criteria, however, led some courts to infer from this that
any earnings above cost, no matter how slight, were not confiscatory. A fallacy exists in this reasoning; it fails to comprehend that
the rate of return on common equity is a cost which, like taxes or
wages, should be recovered in full from ratepayers.
Generally, the proposition that a rate could not be set aside as
confiscatory if it produced some return, even though less than a
reasonable return, has not been given credence in recent years by
either regulatory authorities or the courts. Obviously, a utility
would not be able to compete for the attraction of capital if it had
no opportunity to obtain adequate earnings. Thus, for example,
the Texas Supreme Court referred to the distinction between "confiscation" and "unreasonableness" as largely academic, stating
that once it is acknowledged that the return is unreasonable, it is
"overly metaphysical if we add that there is no constitutional question involved, or no right to judicial review without a statute, unless the rate actually produces red figures on a financial
statement."8 1
This appears to be the settled doctrine in the federal courts.
Rates must produce an adequate return rather than merely something above an operating loss:
The character of the rate has always been determined, in our
law, by its relationship to the sum of a number of components.
Those components, principally, are the expenses of the operation, and allowance for depreciation or depletion, and a proper
return to the company.
A rate order which does not provide for proper allowable expenses, taxes, depreciation and return, is unfair, unreasonable
80. 262 U.S. at 690.
81. General Tel. Co. of the Southwest v. City of Wellington, 156 Tex. 238, 244, 292
S.W.2d 385, 389 (1956); see also Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 156
Me. 295, 163 A.2d 762 (1960); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tennessee Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 202 Tenn. 465, 304 S.W.2d 640 (1957); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 15 P.U.R.3d 328 (La. Dist. Ct. 1956).
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and confiscatory. We
thought it unnecessary to recite that ob82
vious basic premise.
Minnesota cases support the view that the constitutionally protected return equals a fair and reasonable return. In Northern States
Power Co. v. City of St. Paul,83 the court observed:
It is equally well settled that some form ofjudicial review of
the reasonableness of rates fixed by the ratemaking body is an
essential requirement in the exercise of due process.
Denial of an application for increased rates, where existing
conditions 4require it, has the same effect as fixing unreasonably
low rates.

8

.

United States Supreme Court Decisions

The history of the participation of the United States Supreme
Court in the development of confiscation standards is brief and not
current. It is characterized by pronouncements of the fair return
or fair profit standard with little instruction as to the criteria for
fairness. The story of rate regulation in this country could well be
told in terms of the efforts by legislatures, commissions, expert witnesses and, sometimes, courts to supply these criteria.
Beginning in Munn v. Illinois,8 5 decided in 1876, the United
States Supreme Court recognized the need for and constitutionality of legislative control of public utility rates. The Court held
that public service businesses were subject to special statutory
price-fixing regulations. There followed a considerable period of
rate setting by legislative bodies, state or municipal, without the
benefit of administrative agencies.
It later became apparent that state legislatures had neither the
special competence nor adequate procedures for making fine economic adjustments in rate regulations, and the judiciary intervened in the process. In Smylh v. Ames,86 a landmark rate case
decided in 1898, the United States Supreme Court established
guidelines that legislatures must follow in making rate determinations. Smyth indicated that failure to adhere to the guidelines
would result in a judicial denial of a legislated rate order. The
82. Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. Federal Power Cornm'n, 163 F.2d 433, 450-51
(D.C. Cir. 1947).
83. 256 Minn. 489, 99 N.W.2d 207 (1959).
84. Id. at 493-95, 99 N.W.2d at 211.
85. 90 U.S. 113 (1876).
86. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
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Court introduced the confiscation standard, establishing the "fair
value" rule as setting the normal limit below which rates imposed
by a legislative body would be held "confiscatory."
The creation of state regulatory agencies in the early 1900's facilitated more efficient implementation of the Smyth guidelines. By
the nature of their specialized function, regulatory agencies proved
better able than courts at making the continuous adjustments necessary to conform rates to changing economic conditions. Yet, the
constitutional standards continued to require certain minimum
criteria for rate of return to avoid confiscation.
After some experience, the Court, in Bluefteld, established three
standards for determining a "reasonable rate of return." First, the
return must be "equal to that generally being made.

.

.

on invest-

ments in other business undertakings which are attended by corresponding risks and uncertainties." Second, it must be "reasonably
sufficient to assure confidence in the financial soundness of the
utility." Finally, the return must be "adequate, under efficient
and economical management, [to allow the company] to maintain
and support its credit and enable it to raise the money necessary
8' 7
for the proper discharge of its public duties.
Finally, in Hope, the Court indicated that "fair value," as espoused in Smylh v. Ames, was the end result of ratemaking, not the
starting point. In discussing the concept of fair return the Hope
Court stated:
[Ilt is important that there be enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business.
These include service on the debt and dividends on the
stock. .

.

. By that standard the return to the equity owner

should be commensurate with returns on investments in other
enterprises having corresponding risks. That return, moreover,
should be sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to attract
capital. 88

With Hope, the Court appeared to retreat from its earlier,
broader, pronouncements on the subject.8 9 Since that time it has
not granted certiorari on a single case arising from a state commission order and has not directly considered the issue of return on
87. 262 U.S. at 692-93.
88. 320 U.S. at 603 (citations omitted).
89. See Welch, Status of Regulatory Commissions Under the Hope Natural Gas Decision, 32
GEo. L.J. 136, 142, 148-49 (1944).
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common equity.9° According to one authority:
[T]he dicta in the court's opinion as to the broad "end result"
test of the adequacy of the return, together with the earlier
opinion expressed in FederalPower Commission v. Natural Gas Pipehne Co., (1942) 315 U.S. 572, 42 PUR. N.S. 129, left little doubt
that the U.S. Supreme Court would refuse to examine the
methods employed by a state commission in a rate case, where
the alleged confiscation under the Fourteenth Amendment was
the only basis for federal court review. 9 1
The Court had considered and decided several cases between
Smyth and Hope besides Bluefield. The others may be only a historical curiosity, but a brief review of them does dramatize the shallowness of the Supreme Court's exposure to this issue and the
radical changes which have taken place since the confiscation standard was last articulated. Indirectly, it may suggest some areas
where the identifying marks of confiscation could be located.
Five rarely cited cases, dealing directly with the return on equity
component, will be reviewed. All five involved petitions for federal injunctive relief for municipal rate setting ordinances. As a
group, they can be said to be discouraging of judicial review,
though for reasons which have lost their vitality with the passage
of time.
The first, City of Knoxville v. Knoxville Water Co. ,92 involved a decree obtained in federal court enjoining the enforcement of a municipal ordinance fixing maximum water rates in 1901. 9 3 Net
income under the maximum rates was shown to be less than six
percent of the value of the property employed in the business. The
Court paid excessive, and inappropriate, deference to legislative
discretion of the municipality, 94 but recognized its duty to safeguard against abuse. 95 Yet, on the basis that the company was
certain to obtain some net revenue from the rates, the Court held that
the confiscation was not "clearly apparent."
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. ,96 decided on the same day, simi90. Hope was, of course, a review of a federal administrative decision, but its constitutional analysis is applicable to review of state administrative orders.
91. F. WELCH, CASES ON PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 265 (1936).
92. 212 U.S. 1 (1909).
93. Note that the rates were set seven years prior to the court's decision.
94. See 212 U.S. at 8 ("the function of rate-making ispurey legislative in its character") (emphasis added).
95. Id at 17 ("in a clear case of confiscation it is the right and duty of the court to
annul the law").
96. 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
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larly reviewed a federal injunction against rates established by the
City of New York for gas service. As a precursor of the Bluefield
test, the Court stated:
There is no particular rate of compensation which must in all
cases and in all parts of the country be regarded as sufficient for
capital invested in business enterprises. Such compensation
must depend greatly upon circumstances and locality; among
other things, the amount of risk in the business is a most important factor, as well as the locality where the business is conducted and the rate expected and usually realized there upon
investments of a somewhat similar nature with regard to the
risk attending them. There may be other matters which in
some cases might also be properly taken into account in determining the rate which an investor might properly expect or
hope to receive and which he would be entitled to without legislative interference. The less risk, the less right to any unusual
returns upon the investments. One who invests his money in a
business of a somewhat hazardous character is very properly
held to have the right to a larger return without legislative interference, than can be obtained from an investment in Government bonds or other perfectly safe security. The man that
invested in gas stock in 1823 had a right to look for and obtain,
if possible, a much greater rate upon his investment than he
who invested in such property in the city of New York years
after the risk and danger involved had been almost entirely
97
eliminated.
The Court determined that an investment in a gas company involves a risk that "is reduced almost to a minimum"
since, so far as it is given us to look into the future, it seems as
certain as anything of such a nature can be, that the demand
for gas will increase, and, at the reduced price, increased to a
considerable extent. An interest in such a business is as near a
safe and secure investment as can be imagined with regard to
any private manufacturing business. 98
The Court reversed the lower court's confiscation finding.

Cedar Rapids Gas Light Co. v. City of Cedar Rapids 99 followed in
1912 and similarly affirmed the maximum rates set for gas by the
municipality. The Court approved the state court's decision to defer action on the issue until the rates had actually been placed into
effect, so their impact on earnings could be precisely measured.
97. Id at 48-49.
98. Id
99. 223 U.S. 655 (1912).
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Des Moines Gas Co. v. City of Des Moines too also determined that
the rates must first be tested by actual experience before confiscation could be determined. While the master had reported that the
company ought to earn 8%, the allowed return of 6% would produce a lower price, which would increase sales and thus conceivably produce greater profitability.
Finally, Brush Electric Co. v. City of Galveston 101 similarly ruled
that the rates cannot be determined to be confiscatory until
tested. 0 2 The district court had further noted a difficulty in dealing with the impact of inflation:
The district judge did not agree with the master's findings, but
substituted no base value of his own, because of his conclusion
that the injunction should be deniedon the ground that the ordinance has had no test, and
that in my view, taking the master's base, the ordinance is
still not confiscatory, it will not be necessary for me to hazard a guess as to what value ought to be taken, since I feel
sure that before the precise valuation of the plant by me can become
important, conditions ofprices and values wi/l have settled down to
such a definite andpermanentbasis as that there will be no difficuly
in reachinga properprice basis to apply on anyfuture adjustment in
03
or out of court. '

With these rather narrow cases under its belt, a watershed of
sorts was reached with the Bluefield decision coming just one year
later in 1923. In Bluefield, the Court expanded and deepened its
analysis and set down broad standards which remain the "last
word" on the subject. Hope represented a change in mood, more
accurately, an announcement that the Court was calling a moratorium on the review of utility confiscation cases. It did not alter the
basic standard set forth in Bluefield, but rather perpetuated them
before walking off stage.
The task was left unfinished. As the Court itself acknowledged
in a more recent decade:
Although neither law nor economics has yet devised generally
accepted standards for the evaluation of rate making orders, it
must, nonetheless, be obvious that reviewing courts will require
criteria more discriminating than justice and arbitrariness if
100. 238 U.S. 153 (1915).
101. 262 U.S. 443 (1923).
102. Id at 446 ("An actual test of these rates may result in a larger return, by bringing
about an increase of business.").
103. Id at 445 (quoting the district court) (emphasis added).
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they are sensibly to appraise the Commission's orders. The
court in Hope found appropriate criteria by inquiring whether
"the return to the equity owner [is] commensurate with returns
on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks"
and whether the return was "sufficient to assure confidence in
the financial integrity of the enterprise so as to maintain its
credit and to attract capital." . . . These criteria, suitably
modified to reflect the special circumstances of area regulation,
remain pertinent, but they scarcely exhaust the relevant
considerations.104

C

Relevant Considerations

The Court's constitutional review of state rate of return allowances was performed against a backdrop which no longer exists, or exists in a radically altered form. From our earlier
discussion of the pre-Bluefield cases, it was seen that strong emphasis was given to such factors as:
Locality--Since utilities were then small, local enterprises, whose
stock was traded locally, specific analysis of the cost of equity for
comparable investments in that locality had to be made. This
presented a practical obstacle to the development of consistent national standards and likely was part of the reason for the Court's
retreat from this field. The locality of comparable earnings is of
reduced significance today. The stock and bonds of most major
utilities trade nationally and the investors' perception of those securities can be analyzed from national market information.
Price Elasticity--Since a lower price could stimulate higher demand, the Court was evidently unwilling to say that a reduction in
rates would, per se, be confiscatory-speculating that it might induce sufficient growth in sales to produce greater net earnings.
This consideration is inapplicable today in the energy field for at
least two reasons. First, it runs counter to the national policy of
conservation of scarce resources, which has proscribed the ability
of utilities to undertake efforts to increase earnings by promoting
an increase in sales. Second, it ignores the magnitude of inflation
which no longer provides the luxury of a wait-and-see approach-the stakes are just too high to make a decision based on the chance
that it might work out.
Stable Dollar Values--Since inflation was seen as transient, not
104. Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 710-91 (1968) (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
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the long-term norm, little concern had to be paid to time lags or
"temporary" changes in the value of money. Today, high levels of
inflation are the norm. The time value of money is a major concern among financial institutions. Delays caused by environmental requirements, when coupled with inflation, produce
astronomical capital requirements for utilities.
Minimum Risk-Since the opportunity to earn an allowed return
is protected by law, little effort was made to grant utility returns
comparable to non-regulated industries, whose risks were far
greater. Today's investors may perceive this risk comparison quite
differently, recognizing that the so-called safe returns from utility
investments have not come close to compensating for the inflation
risk.
With nearly fifty years of additional experience since Hope, it is
possible to suggest some identifying marks of confiscation which,
as guidelines, would give judicial review better focus than the extremely broad criteria of Bluefield and Hope. While these marks are
interrelated and may exist in combination, they are offered as individual and independent tests, any one of which would be indicative of confiscation unless insubstantial or counterbalanced.
1. Market Price Below Book Value
The first, and perhaps most significant, single indicator is a market price below book value. We speak here not of a brief excursion
into a negative market-to-book ratio, which may be produced by
extraneous factors against which regulation was not obliged to
protect. Clearly, these temporary excursions do not establish confiscation per se, as noted in Boston Edison Co. v. Department of Pub/ic
Utilities:105
We cannot say as a matter of law that the Constitution requires
ratepayers to sustain the price of Boston Edison's stock above
book value except to the extent absolutely necessary to maintain sufficient investor confidence to allow the business to continue as usual. Ultimately, it is investor confidence, not
dilution considered by itself, that is the constitutionally significant criterion. 106
Even brief excursions below book value might tend to indicate
105. 375 Mass. 1, 375 N.E.2d 305 (1978).
106. Id at 17, 375 N.E.2d 305, 317 (1978).
We do not necessarily endorse the Massachusetts court's application of this approach
to the facts that were before it, but accept the principle stated when applied to short term
impacts on the market to book value ratio. Minnesota, it could be argued, has been more
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confiscation, though requiring consideration of other relevant factors. Where, however, the negative market-to-book ratio persists
over several accounting periods, and perhaps several rate applications, confiscation should be found. Financial integrity, as protected by Bluefield and Hope, must minimally require the
maintenance of stock prices somewhat above book value over the
long run. 10 7 Where market prices fall below book value for sustained periods of time and new common shares are issued, those
shares produce dilution of the existing shareholders' interest and
are not competitive with market values of shares of unregulated
companies.
Interestingly enough, the Minnesota commission has, indirectly,
reinforced the existence of market prices below book value for
many of the utilities it regulates. Since its 1977 decision in Interstate
Power Company,' 08 the commission has virtually adopted the discounted cash flow theory as its exclusive method. As stated by
then-Commissioner Sasseville, dissenting in Ottertail Power

Company :109

The Minnesota Public Service Commission has come to rely
almost exclusively on the discounted cash flow method to determine the cost of equity capital. It is an important and valuable
tool in ratemaking, but it is not a formula of objective and scientific certitude. It is not the pythagorean theorem. Rather, as
all witnesses have stated, it is greatly reliant on the subjective
judgments of the analyst who selects its component parts."Io
The DCF theory, of course, had earlier been criticized by the commission and the Minnesota Supreme Court for the very reason
that its application would tend to force the market price to book
value. In Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. State,"' the commission
demanding in appearing to equate dilution and confiscation. See Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. State, 299 Minn. 1, 27, 216 N.W.2d 841, 857 (1974).
107. Many commentators would argue that a market-to-book-value ratio at or slightly
above one is not an adequate goal, since, to "merely . . . be able to issue new shares
without dilution of per-share book equity ignores the competitive cost standard and has no
valid rationale." Foster, Fair Return Critena and Estinaton, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 883, 919
(1976). We need not address the argument from some increment of market price above
book value currently since utilities under Minnesota jurisdiction have been below book
value for several years running.
108. Docket No. E-00l/GR-76-1826 (Minn. P.S.C. June 30, 1977) (announced just one
month before adoption of North Central doctrine).
109. Otter Tail Power Company, Docket No. E-017/GR-77-916 (Minn. P.S.C. Aug. 1,
1978).
110. Id. at 34 (Sasseville, C., dissenting).
111. 299 Minn. 1, 216 N.W.2d 841 (1974).
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was quoted with approval by the court for these observations:
If this Commission undertook to drive the market price of the
stock of a regulated company to book value and it became necessary to issue additional stock at a price below book in order to
market such stock it would have the effect of confiscating a part
of the value of the property of existing stockholders.' 12
Barely three years after the court's blessing of the commission's
refusal to directly adopt DCF results, the commission commenced
a pattern which adopted DCF as the exclusive test. Simultaneously, it consistently reduced, to virtual elimination, the usual adjustments for market pressure and cost of issuance, which attempt
to produce a market price sufficiently above book value to enable
the sale of new common shares at net proceeds equal to book."13
In addition, the commission's use of North Central to adopt the low4
est DCF study produced returns that were not credibly based"
112. Id at 27, 216 N.W.2d at 857.
113. The commission's reduction was based upon two rationales: (1) even where a
company was issuing new shares, the adjustment need not be applied to the growth portion of the DCF formula and (2) where a company did not intend to issue significant
numbers of shares in the test year, no adjustment at all was appropriate. See Minnesota
Power & Light Co., Docket No. E-015/GR-77-360 (Minn. P.S.C. Feb. 3, 1978) (item (I));
Minnesota Power & Light Co., Docket No. E-015/GR-80-76 (Minn. P.U.C. Jan. 30, 1981)
(item (2)). A cogent argument against both rationales is made by Foster:
Another question, assuming application of the DCF formula, is whether the
adjustment should be applied only to the dividend yield portion or to the total
return requirement, including the growth component. Some have contended
that there is no market pressure or financing cost applicable to the growth component, and would adjust only the dividend yield.
That procedure looks to form instead of substantive content in an application of the discounted cash flow formula. Market pressure concerns the relationship between price paid for new capital and expected future earnings, not merely
the relationship between the price and current dividends. The price of common
stock is the present worth of all anticipated monetary benefits, not merely current dividends or future dividends at the current rate. Therefore, market pressure is an adjustment of the investor's capitalization rate, not of the current
dividend yield independent of the expected growth rate.
The error of the contention that market pressure, the discount from the
current price required to attract new capital, relates only to dividends may be
more obvious in the not uncommon situation where investors expect no growth
of per-share earnings. If the price of a stock is one-hundred five dollars in day-today trading and investors pay one-hundred dollars to realize a future return of
fourteen dollars, the adjusted capitalization rate is obviously 14 percent. I do
not understand how the cost of capital can be any different if investor expectations take the form of a current dividend yield plus a dividend growth rate of 7
percent instead of the otherwise anticipated 14 percent return.
Costs of financing include underwriting commissions and expenditures incurred directly by the issuing company in order to give access to new capital.
Like market pressure, costs of financing represent a reduction of the whole, not
some fraction of what otherwise would be the net proceeds from a stock offering.
Foster, supra note 107, at 925-26.
114. This is evidenced by Hibbing Taconite Co. v. State, 302 N.W.2d 5 (Minn. 1980),
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and were not, in fact, sufficient to enable significant improvement
in the market-to-book ratio. While DCF contemplates that earned
returns at the level indicated will move the market price to at least
book value, utilities that were able to earn at or near the allowed
rate continued to experience negative market-to-book ratios.
2. Equity Risk Premium
Historically, debt costs have been well below equity and were
the least expensive external capital for construction purposes.
Since, however, a utility with an inadequate rate of return on equity was in danger of poor financial ratings for its debt, there was
ample incentive for adequate equity returns, even with the highly
leveraged debt ratios typically carried by utilities. In today's economy, rising debt costs have actually outrun equity allowances,
placing utilities in the anomalous position of providing a lesser return for its junior risk securities.
Rates of return on equity below interest rates on newly issued
debt are confiscatory; they clearly do not meet the constitutional
test of providing a return sufficient to enable the attraction of investors to equity as against debt. Equity and debt obligations are
obviously alternative investment opportunities.
Some financial experts argue that, in periods of high inflation,
the equity-to-debt premium could actually turn negative, justifying
lower equity returns. No empirical proof of this has ever been provided to the Minnesota commission and, to the authors'
knowledge, no witness has actually testified that the crossover into
a negative equity risk premium has occurred in recent periods of
unprecedented inflation. Yet, commission return allowances have
been consistently below debt costs.
Without engaging in the more sophisticated debate as to the
level of equity premium required, courts should at least determine
that equity returns below debt costs are legally inadequate.
3.

Bondrating Criteria Not Met

This factor may not be important in all cases because bondrating criteria are often difficult to obtain because of confidentiality
asserted by rating agencies and the range of criteria for a given
rating may be very broad and not meaningful for a utility situated
the only Minnesota Supreme Court decision to review a commission rate of return finding
under North Central.
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in the middle. There are those cases, however, where a utility is at
the low edge of a rating category and is able to produce evidence
of an imminent derating. A subfactor here would be rapid declines or sustained substandard levels of interest coverage.," 5
4. History of Inabi'hy to Earn at or Near the Rate Allowed
Over an extended period of time a commission is able to gauge
the realism of its orders---does the utility come close to actually
earning at the level authorized by the rate order? Factors preventing such earnings are generally associated with regulatory lag or
unpredicted levels of inflation. While not meaningful in terms of
one order, a consistent pattern of deficient earnings, in relation to
regular rate cases, would suggest that the regulatory practices are
producing confiscation.
5

Major Shifts n Investor Attitudes

At a recent rate case, one of the witnesses was the representative
of an institutional investor. He testified that his institution's analysis required a return on investment in the range of nineteen to
twenty percent to interest it in an electric utility stock-a range
that was beyond that even requested in the case. The message
clearly given is that institutional investors currently have no attraction to electric utility stocks.
This was not always so. In fact, the same witness recounted how
in the 1960's many electrical utilities had institutional investors as
the majority of their shareholders. A mass exodus of institutional
investors from utility stocks occurred in the 1970's, to the point
where less than five percent of the subject company's shares were
held by institutions. A change of this magnitude, coupled with
other indicia of declining investor preference for utility stocks,
should be regarded as strong evidence that historic returns are constitutionally inadequate for the future.
D.

Conclusion." ConstitutionalStandards

Justice FrankftUrter, dissenting in Hope, was amazingly prophetic
of the dilemma facing judicial review in attempting to apply the
broad Bluefteld-Hope criteria to the complex and radically altered
economy of the 1970's and 1980's. He said:
115. Coverage ratios represent the number of times that the utility's net income exceeds its fixed costs of capital, thus indicating the relative safety of debt holders.
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The requirement that rates must be "just and reasonable"
means just and reasonable in relation to appropriate standards.
Otherwise Congress would have directed the Commission to fix
such rates as in the judgment of the Commission are just and
reasonable; it would not have also provided that such determi16
nations by the Commission are subject to court review.'
Identifying marks do exist, which can relieve the court from total
dependence upon the "expertise" of either the commission or any
single witness the commission chooses to endorse. Particularly
now, when utilities have fallen out of investor favor and yet bias in
favor of the ratepayers is constantly urged, and even legislated, the
court must be looked to for necessary constitutional protection.
This it can provide by putting more flesh on the confiscation
doctrine.

116. 320 U.S. 591, 626 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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